


Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC

# Swiss Cooperation Programme Zimbabwe and Zambia 2023–2026





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### **Foreword**

With its strong human and natural resources, a youth dividend, solid economic growth and relative peace Southern Africa bears a high potential for economic prosperity, social development and stability. On the other hand, important challenges remain, in terms of insufficient economic diversification, increased vulnerability through climate change, high rates of income equality, endemic corruption and poor performance of key governance institutions. Switzerland wants to help leverage this potential in Southern Africa and contribute to an increased wellbeing of the population.

Switzerland has been engaged in Southern Africa since the early 2000s with a programme first based in South Africa, then expanded to several other countries. In 2016 the regional Swiss Cooperation Office moved from Pretoria to Harare, and merged with the Humanitarian Office that had been working out of the Swiss Embassy for a decade.

After more than twenty years of successful implementation of a regional approach and in alignment with the International Cooperation Strategy 2021–2024, the Regional Programme of Southern Africa (RPSA) was streamlined and reshaped to focus on the two countries, Zimbabwe and Zambia. The aim is to increase our impact through a concentration of resources and the exploitation of opportunities for direct exchange with national actors. This document is thus the first of its kind and presents the main action lines of this new focus.

The regional perspective will nevertheless be maintained, as Switzerland will keep a few regional flagship projects involving several countries and good practices from bilateral project implementation will be brought to scale and harnessed in policy dialogue within the SADC, counting on its strong political and convening role.

Over the past years Switzerland achieved important results through the two main pillars of the Regional Programme – sexual and reproductive health and food security. Strengthened food security and incomes, and improved health and resilience are kept as objectives. The new programme will develop a more comprehensive approach and cover additional areas such as job creation, support to private sector and climate change. It will also address the strengthening of health and food systems, as well as integrative value chains. A new outcome on accountable, participatory and inclusive governance seeks to achieve more integrated, systemic and sustainable change and better mutual social accountability. It can build on the experiences and trustful relations that the Swiss peace policy programme established with national institutions and partners since 2015.

Switzerland remains committed as a long-standing, reliable partner to work hand in hand with Zimbabwe and Zambia and the region more broadly, in its path of creating positive prospects for the present and future generations.

Patricia Danzi Director-General SDC

Livia Leu State Secretary FDFA

### **Development Context**

The countries of the Southern Africa region are disparate in many ways, but they also share a common history and are highly interconnected – socially, politically, economically and environmentally – including as members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The region is relatively peaceful compared to other parts of Africa, and, with strong human and natural resources to build upon, it bears high potential in terms of economic development, prosperity and wealth. But for now, Southern Africa faces the highest rates of income inequality on the continent and low scores on many social indicators, a situation that has been further exacerbated by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and the consequences of the war in Ukraine. Poverty, exclusion and weak governance pose threats to stability and sustainable development.

Zambia and Zimbabwe, two neighbouring states in Southern Africa, are landlocked countries, whose development prospects and global competitiveness are inextricably linked with regional integration and the progress of their neighbours. Zimbabwe in particular relies heavily on South Africa for trade, especially imports. Both countries aspire to reach upper middle-income status by 2030. In this respect, large cohorts of young people provide them an important but challenging opportunity to capitalize on the demographic dividend.

#### Political developments and security

From a governance perspective, achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Zambia and Zimbabwe remains work in progress. Both countries have continued to face vested interests, authoritarian and populist features and political intolerance and polarization. Such a long-lasting and unconducive policy environment has hampered reforms for democratic state building and sound public finance management, especially in Zimbabwe where it has also cemented

Zambia gained independence in 1964. Since 1991, it has endured as a functioning multi-party democracy with relatively free and fair elections. 2021 saw a peaceful transition of power to the opposition. Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980. Politics have been dominated by one party while the opposition has repeatedly contested the outcome of elections.

weak social accountability and non-representative electoral and political processes.

Despite efforts to improve transparency and oversight, endemic corruption at all levels, and in key sectors of the economy, has severely jeopardized progress towards sustainable socio-economic development, and in Zimbabwe it has hampered much-needed foreign private sector investments in the economy. According to the 2021 Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International, Zimbabwe and Zambia rank 157 and 117 respectively out of 180 countries.

Under these circumstances, key state institutions which lack political economic impetus coupled with weak capacities, are struggling to deliver on their mandates, thus impacting the rule of law. The situation of large groups of the population living in extreme poverty, in particular youth and women, has not received adequate attention and political elites have not managed to allocate the necessary funding to address their needs. Moreover, an increasing use of law enforcement and security forces for partisan political ends has affected state-citizen relations. In Zimbabwe, the political pressure on social and civic space has weakened confidence in public institutions.

Looking ahead, both countries have serious catching-up to do on governance and accountability. In Zambia, the latest election and the transition of power is encouraging for democracy and economic growth and a window of opportunity to bring about systemic change. In Zimbabwe, by contrast, optimism amongst the population following the removal of the country's long-term President Robert Mugabe in 2017 is fading due to financial and economic hardship, contested elections and pressure on the opposition.

### Economic development, employment and income inequality

Both Zambia and Zimbabwe bear high potential in terms of economic development, prosperity and wealth, and are able to build upon good assets, in particular their vast natural resources. Zimbabwe also has a comparatively highly skilled population. Both governments have sought to diversify the economy and to increase foreign direct investment (FDI).

The outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 led to reduced private



sector activity. However, throughout challenging times, and despite constraints to doing business and an only early stage of digitalization, the private sector has continued to provide goods and services and remains an actor to count on.


Meanwhile, after two years of deep recession, GDP in Zimbabwe grew by 6.3% in 2021, which mirrors an exceptionally good agriculture season, relaxing of COVID-19 restrictions and a relative stabilization of prices and the exchange rate. In Zambia, the growth rate was expected to reach 3.1%. Agriculture, mining, tourism and, in Zambia, manufacturing, continue to be the main pillars of the economy.

Triggered by hyperinflation, the Zimbabwean dollar was dropped in 2009 and a temporary multi-currency platform was introduced with the US dollar as the main currency. In 2019, a "new" Zimbabwe dollar was introduced. But confidence in the local currency is weak and a highly distorted parallel currency market has emerged that has exacerbated inequalities. By July 2020, inflation reached a staggering 837 percent (y/y). After a relatively stable period, inflation spiked again to 257 percent in July 2022.

Over the years, both Zambia and Zimbabwe have experienced high and rising public debts that have contributed to severe backlashes on social spending. In light of financial turbulences connected to the change in government in 2021, Zambia was forced to declare insolvency with regard to servicing its foreign debts. Fortunately, the international community has signalled help to clear its arrears. In Zimbabwe, on the contrary, debt relief has remained hostage to the political impasse between the government and the international community and a lack of engagement due to sanctions, concerns about human rights and land reform.

Around 70 percent of the population of Zambia and Zimbabwe depends on agriculture for food, income and employment. More than half live in underserved rural areas where agriculture is based on rain-fed small-scale farming rather than large-scale high-value commercial crops. Informal work and self-employment are prevalent in agriculture and, more broadly, food systems, which means that incomes are volatile, social benefits are either scarce or non-existent, working hours are long and legal protection is weak. Lack of access to relevant skills, finance, productive assets and viable markets hinder productivity and value addition, and prevent informal sector workers from engaging in more gainful economic opportunities.

Weak governance and shocks have fuelled un- and underemployment, with youth being more likely to be among the working poor than the general population. The COVID-19 shock hampered access to agricultural inputs, and millions of people found themselves with reduced incomes, with dire consequences for women, young people and small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular in urban areas. Labour migration opportunities have declined due to political and



economic challenges in South Africa, which has impacted vital remittances. As a result, income inequality is high¹, not just between rural and urban areas, but increasingly within urban areas as well. 49% of Zimbabweans and 54% of Zambians live in extreme poverty.

Looking ahead, despite both countries' high potential, economic growth rates are likely to stagnate at a low to mid one-digit level in both countries. Public debts will continue to consume a considerable percentage of national budgets, thus putting social spending at risk. On a positive note, potential youth entrepreneurs are open to introducing innovations and are a pillar of hope for prosperous economies. New opportunities could also arise from growing regional integration. Global supply bottlenecks and increasing prices of commodities at the global level could benefit shorter supply chains with more value addition at the local level. In 2021, the Government of Zambia adopted a private-sector friendly approach, the implementation of which remains to be seen. The Zimbabwean economic situation will greatly depend on how the government manages to combine short-term crisis management with longer-term structural reforms.

#### Social development and basic services

Both rural and urban poor in Zambia and Zimbabwe have limited access to health, education and nutrition, which has particularly affected the wellbeing of women and young people as well as of vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities and people living with HIV.<sup>2</sup>

Significant progress has been made in attaining key health targets such as the 90:90:90 UNAIDS targets for HIV epidemic control.<sup>3</sup> However, funding has fallen short of the Abuja Declaration annual target of allocating 15% of national budgets to healthcare. Moreover, the health sectors have been crippled by weak policy frameworks, a shortage of healthcare workers due to meagre salaries and considerable brain drain due to foreign recruitment and erratic electricity and water supplies. Services are generally substandard and national insurance schemes are far removed from the realities of the population.

The public health systems of Zambia and Zimbabwe have struggled immensely to cope with the double burden of

<sup>1</sup> GINI index (World Bank estimate): Zimbabwe: 50.3 (2019); Zambia: 57.1 (2017). Zambia has the fourth-highest Gini index in the world.

<sup>2</sup> Zimbabwe ranks 150th in the Human Development Index which positions 189 countries according to their progress on health, education and income, and Zambia 156th. Human Development Report 2020. HDI value (2019): Zimbabwe (0.571) and Zambia (0.584).

<sup>3 90%</sup> of all people living with HIV knowing their HIV status; 90% of all people with diagnosed HIV infection receiving sustained antiretroviral therapy (ART); 90% of all people receiving ART having viral suppression.

communicable and non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Uncontrolled NCDs, sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), maternal and child health, family planning and gender-based violence (GBV) remain persistent challenges, especially for young men and women. In addition, COVID-19 added strain on the health systems as funds were diverted and because limited mobility and school closures hindered the delivery of and access to critical (youth-friendly) health information and services. Stigma towards the still considerable number of people (especially youth) living with HIV also remains a problem.<sup>4</sup> Increasing poverty, food insecurity, lack of economic perspectives and COVID-19 have also taken a toll on the mental health and psychological wellbeing of the population.

Whereas the Zimbabwean education system used to be one of the strongest in the region, nowadays education outcomes are generally poor in both countries, especially in rural public schools, and have further suffered during the pandemic. During prolonged school closures, pupils with insufficient access to online learning alternatives were most affected and have fallen behind. The vital food and nutrition security support that schools provide became unavailable. Post-pandemic, parents are demotivated to invest their meagre household incomes in school fees and related costs, especially for girls. In this regard, Zambia made a considerable step towards equality by abolishing school fees.

Flows of money, goods and services, information and knowledge between rural and urban areas have intensified as a result of growing small and medium-sized towns. They play an important role in employment generation and for ensuring more predictable incomes and decent livelihoods. These rural-urban interlinkages have also helped mitigate chronic food insecurity, which has soared due to different kinds of shocks (the economic impact of COVID-19 and, especially in Zimbabwe, inflation and dependence on imports). Urban areas have become increasingly vulnerable because of the lack of decent jobs and sufficient incomes. Social protection systems, including support provided by families and communities, are inadequate and increasingly under pressure.

Looking ahead, multi-dimensional poverty will likely remain pervasive in large parts of the low-income population segments in Zambia and Zimbabwe, with poor women and young people bearing the brunt. Despite further government measures and international cooperation, many people who lack access to basic services and rights will continue to struggle in their daily lives. Without stronger institutional and societal resilience to shocks – including environmental calamities further exacerbated by climate change – many others will also be left behind. Robust systems for social protection are needed more than ever.

#### Environment and climate change

The potential for economic growth in Zambia and Zimbabwe is closely linked with the development of their natural resources. Policy frameworks and institutional set-ups for managing environmental challenges are in general quite robust. The main problem relates to the implementation and enforcement of existing legislation and policies, hampered by weak coordination and cross-sectoral cooperation.

Zimbabwe's coal mines and power projects and deforestation in Zambia are large sources of greenhouse gas emissions. They are, together with unsustainable farming practices, in particular in large-scale commercial farming units, harming the environment and accelerating degradation.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) classifies Zambia and Zimbabwe as fragile contexts. Both countries have entrenched high levels of vulnerability, due to natural disasters and the potential for internal conflict. In particular the rural and urban poor, women and youth, are less and less resilient to shocks,.

At the same time, the negative effects of climate change are growing, marked by an increase in extreme weather events such as flash floods, droughts, heatwaves and storms. With exceptions, such as in 2020–2021, poor rainfall seasons are becoming the norm.

Combined with weak governance and insufficient preparedness, climate change further exacerbates damage on physical assets, degraded ecosystems and reduced output from key economic sectors. Furthermore, climate shocks have impacted crop and livestock production, especially for households that rely on rain-fed agriculture, resulting in food, nutrition and water insecurity and reduced income.

For lack of preparedness, even predictable weather variations have frequently developed into emergencies, with severe impacts on livelihoods and a worsening of widespread chronic poverty. Humanitarian interventions have been able to alleviate deficits temporarily, but they are less sustainable in the long term than enhancing (ecosystem-based) resilience and establishing social support systems to respond to future shocks.

Looking ahead, climate change effects and environmental management challenges, to which Zambia and Zimbabwe are exposed with a certain regularity, are threatening to undermine poverty reduction gains and the achievement of development goals. The population of Zimbabwe is particularly vulnerable. Future climate-related shocks could especially slow agriculture and energy production given the countries' dependency on rain-fed hydropower generation and further degrade the environment.

<sup>4</sup> World Bank: Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15–49) in Zimbabwe: 11.9% (2020); in Zambia 11.1% (2020). HIV prevalence rates in Zambia (15–24): 4.1%; in Zimbabwe (15–24): 4.6%.

# Swiss Foreign Policy Objectives and Donor Context

#### Swiss interests and added value

Switzerland's engagement in Southern Africa dates back to 1960s. By 2005, a Swiss regional programme emerged covering Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho and Eswatini, based on the potential for scaling up successful initiatives in food security and HIV prevention, as well as the prospect of influencing policies at SADC level.<sup>5</sup> Switzerland is perceived as a neutral country without colonial history in Africa, and thus has been able to build constructive and partnership-based relations in international cooperation. It is known for its long-term commitments, respect for international law, political coherence and adaptability.

Switzerland is considered a legitimate and reliable partner with good knowledge of the Southern Africa region as well as flexibility to combine development cooperation with humanitarian aid. With its expertise Switzerland has been able to carve out comparative advantages in its areas of intervention. Complemented by political experience and credibility in promoting a peaceful and democratic transition to stability in Zimbabwe, it has contributed to improving people's lives through increased food security and reduced new HIV infections. The relocation of the Swiss Cooperation Office from Pretoria to Harare in 2016 was a strong signal of Swiss commitment towards the Zimbabwe government.

Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2021–2024 shifted Switzerland's geographical focus to Zimbabwe and Zambia. Safeguarding Zimbabwe and Zambia against destabilization, further socio-economic deterioration and conflict is in line with Swiss international commitments and long tradition of promoting humanitarian principles, peace and human rights. The Swiss and Swiss-based private sector is also active in this region: in Zimbabwe Switzerland remains the largest European investor through multinational companies in food processing, construction material, fuels, manufacturing, logistics and agriculture, whereas in Zambia, Swiss companies are present in sectors linked to the downstream of natural resources.

#### Donor landscape

Neither Zambia nor Zimbabwe are amongst Africa's largest recipients of official development assistance (ODA). In 2019, net ODA for Zambia totalled USD 987.0 million; for Zimbabwe USD 912.7 million. The United States, the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the European Union (EU) and Sweden are the top five development partners in Zambia. The United States, the Global Fund and the EU are also among the top five in Zimbabwe, alongside the United Kingdom and UNICEF.6 A considerable amount of bilateral ODA has been directed to the health and population sectors, social infrastructure and services in both countries. 21% of bilateral ODA for Zimbabwe was allocated as humanitarian aid. Switzerland is a relatively small donor in financial terms in both countries, but notably one of only few bilateral donors in Zimbabwe where many traditional donors have left or reduced their support due to concerns about the political situation.

Switzerland participates in the relevant donor working groups in both countries and the Zambian and Zimbabwe-an governments are increasingly involved in pooled funding mechanisms. There is a general hesitancy amongst donors to work through government systems or provide direct budget support.

<sup>5</sup> Separate bilateral Swiss cooperation programmes are in place for South Africa (SECO only) and Mozambique (SDC and SECO).

<sup>6</sup> OECD-DAC Aid at a Glance.

### Key Results and Lessons Learned

#### Key results 2018-2022

The Swiss Regional Cooperation Strategy for Southern Africa 2018–2022 aimed to make a difference to people's livelihoods and to contribute to peace, poverty reduction and sustainable development through regional policy advocacy and implementation of development programmes in Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Eswatini. To this end, it had a very strong focus on two thematic priorities, food security and HIV/SRHR, with a particular emphasis on smallholder farmers, women and youth. Switzerland also contributed to the promotion of peaceful elections and prevention of electoral violence, and supported political dialogue, national reconciliation and human rights activities in Zimbabwe.

In the area of food security, Swiss-supported interventions aimed to enhance crop diversity, strengthen integrated seed systems, increase income-generating activities along agricultural value chains and improve disaster preparedness, response and recovery. Key results stemming from Swiss support include:

- → Exemptions in commercial seed laws and other Swiss-supported initiatives allowed for an unimpeded development of farmer seed systems and increased access to improved seeds and diverse crops for 32,000 smallholder farmers, including in Malawi and Zimbabwe.
- → A new Zimbabwe Irrigation and Mechanization Policy strengthened ownership and transferred management of irrigation schemes to smallholders.
- → In Zambia, the integration of a weather index insurance into the government's Farm Input Subsidy Programme reached an additional one million farmers.
- → The operationalization of the SADC Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis (RVAA) system assisted SADC Member States in gathering information on and responding to food insecurity needs.
- → Building upon cash transfers, 46,000 rural households in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi benefitted from testing and the scaling up of context-specific risk management solutions. In Zimbabwe, resilience programming was expanded to urban areas.





Switzerland also focused its activities on improving youth access to SRHR services and their protective behaviour towards HIV/AIDS. Key results from Swiss supported regional programmes include:

- → SADC Member States endorsed integrated and multi-sectoral HIV/SRHR policies which they proceeded to adapt to national contexts and to implement e.g., Strategy for SRHR in the SADC Region 2019–2030; SADC Model Laws on Child Marriage and Gender-based Violence; Minimum Package of Services and Harmonized M&E Framework for Orphans, Vulnerable Children and Youth; and the Care and Support for Teaching and Learning (CSTL) Framework.
- → Over 10 million adolescents and youth were reached with in- and out-of-school comprehensive sexuality education (CSE) programmes and through social and behavioural change communication. Over 4.8 million adolescents and youth benefitted from integrated HIV and SRHR services. Thanks to increased knowledge and skills, more than 2.3 million young people adopted protective sexual behaviours
- → Psychosocial support (PSS) was recognized as essential for increasing adherence to antiretroviral treatment and coping with disasters and was firmly placed on the social development agenda. An average of two million children were supported every year (including targeted efforts in the aftermath of Cyclone Idai).
- → During COVID-19, Swiss financing piloted innovative interventions such as self-care models and flexible delivery of antiretroviral therapy in Zimbabwe to help minimize the impact of a lack of access to health centres for services and to cut down on transport costs.
- → Over 7,000 youth were directly engaged in dialogues on climate change risks and intersections with SRHR, with another 13,000 indirectly benefiting.

#### Lessons learned

The following lessons are of particular importance for the Swiss Cooperation Programme for Zimbabwe and Zambia 2023–2026:

- → Policy advocacy (both regional and national) based on locally implemented good practices is not enough to bring results to scale. Beyond seeking to influence policy formulation, more focus is needed on promoting effective policy implementation, including through adequate budget allocations and addressing harmful social norms.
- → Building resilience and unlocking economic opportunities are vital due to the myriad of challenges facing the social sectors. Switzerland has largely approached resilience through the lens of climate change. New approaches, innovation and new types of partners are called for. The pandemic has highlighted the need for programmatic flexibility to reimagine the provision and continuation of basic services and ensure that social assistance systems are not only in place, but capable of delivering in the face of external shocks.
- → Interventions focusing on food production alone are not sufficient for improving livelihoods and food security. A broader approach to food systems and rural-urban linkages, with a focus on enhancing the added value of economic activities, is more promising.
- → Addressing HIV and SRHR without taking other determinants of health into account has its limitations and needs to give way to an approach from a broader health and socio-economic perspective, in particular through emphasizing the integrated delivery of quality health services. Provision of PSS as one such service, which Switzerland has championed since the early 2000s, is a primary example given the importance of psychosocial wellbeing as a determinant of resilience to harsh circumstances.
- → Fundamental governance challenges such as public sector accountability and civic participation cannot be addressed solely through a transversal approach. A twin-track approach with mainstreamed and targeted interventions is more promising. In this regard, there is room to deepen collaboration with all actors and instruments of Swiss international cooperation, including with other Swiss programmes in the region where there are interesting opportunities for cross-fertilization.

### **Implications**

The transformation of the Regional Cooperation Strategy for Southern Africa 2018–2022 into a two-country cooperation programme for Zimbabwe and Zambia is regarded as a chance to better anchor Swiss cooperation in fragile and fluid national contexts and to demonstrate greater local impact on wellbeing and livelihoods, human rights and democratic participation.

Building on existing partnerships, accumulated expertise and lessons learned as well as past successes, Swiss bilateral cooperation will further develop and implement a focused portfolio of programmes to address new challenges and seize opportunities in the political, social and economic spheres, including in support of recovering from COVID-19. Compared to previous programme cycles, Switzerland will:

- → Expand work in urban areas especially in selected secondary towns and strengthen linkages with surrounding rural areas.
- → Reach out beyond smallholder farmers and adolescents to benefit a wider target population, with a strong focus on equal opportunities for poor youth and women to thrive, as well as ensuring that marginalised populations (people with disabilities, orphans, people living with HIV, etc) are not left behind in service delivery and resilience building interventions. It is especially essential to foster linkages

- amongst health, education and skills development in order to address the specific vulnerabilities of young people, improve their income opportunities and eventually their livelihood. When needed and appropriate, specific studies will be mandated to better define and assess the needs of the target groups.
- → More prominently feature resilience within the portfolio, with a larger understanding of the different origin of the shocks (climate change induced, socio-economic, political).
- → On the basis of the current engagement in the promotion of peace and human rights, gradually expand the portfolio in the area of good governance, including possibly rule of law and preservation of democratic civic space, financial and economic governance and/or decentralisation, with an initial focus on Zimbabwe.
- → Broaden Swiss long-term support for HIV services to a wider array of strengthened quality integrated health services, social protection and disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures for long-term impact.



# Strategic Orientation of the Swiss Cooperation Programme 2023–2026

As an overall goal, Switzerland will support efforts to increase the well-being of the populations of Zambia and Zimbabwe and to reduce their vulnerability to climate change and other shocks, underpinned by citizen engagement and accountable and resilient public institutions.

#### **SWISS PORTFOLIO OUTCOMES**

Swiss portfolio outcome 1: The rural and urban poor, in particular youth and women, develop and access opportunities that lead to improved food security and predictable and higher incomes

Outcome 1.1: Agricultural production and value chains of nutritious crops are strengthened and climate-resilient

Outcome 1.2: Economic opportunities and (self) employment are increased, especially in food systems

*IC strategy sub-objective 2: Promoting innovative private sector initiatives to facilitate the creation of decent jobs* 

IC strategy sub-objective 3: Addressing climate change and its effects

IC strategy sub-objective 7: Strengthening equitable access to quality basic services

IC strategy sub-objective 9: Strengthening and promoting human rights and gender equality

To achieve this Swiss portfolio outcome, the programme will address key challenges faced by smallholder agricultural producers and other value chain actors by incentivizing and supporting market actors to address prevalent market failures and bottlenecks (Outcome 1.1). The focus will be on value chains of selected climate-resilient and nutritious crops that have the potential to benefit women and youth, and climate-friendly agricultural techniques. An emphasis will be placed on building on and strengthening interlinkages between rural, peri-urban and urban areas. Moreover, the programme will enable poor people, and especially youth

and women, to access and develop economic and (self-) employment opportunities and incentivize private sector actors to expand these opportunities, especially in food systems (Outcome 1.2).

Key interventions to achieve these outcomes include facilitating access to new financial and insurance products and services and strengthening market-relevant and soft skills (including the promotion of diversified and nutritious diets). Furthermore, Switzerland will promote the adoption of drought-tolerant crops, agro-ecological farming practices and access to clean energy. It will provide cash transfers to foster investments in productive activities and support the development and improvement of market linkages.

By strengthening agricultural production, increasing decent jobs and incomes and improving food security, Switzerland will contribute to SDGs 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 13 and 17 in Zambia and Zimbabwe.


















Swiss portfolio outcome 2: Quality service delivery and shock-responsive systems contribute to improved health and resilience, especially of women, youth and other marginalized populations

Outcome 2.1: Primary health care quality integrated services are delivered, in particular for sexual and reproductive health

Outcome 2.2: Shock-responsive social protection and disaster risk reduction systems are in place and strengthened

IC strategy sub-objective 5: Providing emergency aid and ensuring the protection of civilians

IC strategy sub-objective 6: Preventing disasters and ensuring reconstruction and rehabilitation

IC strategy sub-objective 7: Strengthening equitable access to quality basic services

Instead of pursuing SRHR exclusively through an HIV lens, Switzerland will broaden its scope by emphasizing the delivery of a wider array of quality services in an integrated manner and by giving greater attention to the ability of the health care system to deliver these services. At the same time, Switzerland will seek to put in place and strengthen shock-re-

This Swiss portfolio prioritizes the health and resilience of women and young people, as well as other vulnerable and marginalized populations currently, or at risk of being, left behind such as people living with disability, orphans and vulnerable children, people living with HIV, sex workers and LGBTQI people.

sponsive systems to build the resilience of target groups to climate-induced and man-made disasters which have significantly impacted their ability to move out of poverty.

Applying a multi-sectoral approach, cooperation under this particular Swiss portfolio outcome will therefore identify gaps and strategic entry points for integration of services and improving access to quality primary health care services, in particular SRHR, for example through education systems and communities (Outcome 2.1). Switzerland will also support and strengthen the shock-responsiveness of formal and informal social protection and DRR systems, including better targeting and delivery of social assistance and improved reliability of data (Outcome 2.2).

Key interventions to achieve these outcomes include engagement in policy advocacy for better quality and integrated health service delivery as well as for more domestic spending on social protection and DRR mechanisms. To this end, specifically, Switzerland will generate and disseminate data on vulnerabilities. Furthermore, Swiss cooperation will support capacity development in the health, social protection and DRR systems and strengthen health education and referral.

By supporting quality health service delivery and shock-responsive systems, Switzerland will contribute to SDGs 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 13 and 17 in Zambia and Zimbabwe.

















Swiss portfolio outcome 3: Civil society and state institutions engage in more accountable, participatory and inclusive governance

Outcome 3.1: Public institutions effectively deliver services in an accountable way and in respect of human rights

Outcome 3.2: Citizens, specifically youth and women, increasingly participate and influence decision-making

IC strategy sub-objective 8: Preventing conflicts, promoting peace and respect for international law

IC strategy sub-objective 9: Strengthening and promoting human rights and gender equality

IC strategy sub-objective 10: Promoting good governance and the rule of law and strengthening civil society

Human rights and democratic governance are essential components of long-term development and peace. Countries with ineffective government institutions, widespread corruption and weak rule of law are more likely to experience conflict and criminal violence. To strengthen democratic governance and human rights in Zimbabwe and later on also in Zambia, in line with the Guidelines on Human Rights 2021–2024, Switzerland will support selected national and local-level government entities and independent oversight institutions to deliver on their mandates in an accountable manner and in respect of human rights (Outcome 3.1). Furthermore, citizens'

fundamental rights are the foundation for managing and mitigating conflict, promoting economic growth and safeguarding human dignity. Switzerland would therefore also like to see communities empowered and driving their own future, and to this intent will actively promote the participation of especially women and youth in decision-making, including in business and economic-related areas (Outcome 3.2).

Key interventions to achieve these outcomes include anti-corruption efforts and building the technical and human resource capacities of independent oversight institutions. In Zimbabwe, it will promote civil society participation in healing and reconciliation processes and strengthen mechanisms for credible, transparent and inclusive general elections. In the mid-term, additional strategic reflections will be required to develop clear priorities, and identify where Switzerland has good entry points, knowhow, experience and leverage.

By supporting democratic governance and human rights, Switzerland will contribute to SDGs 4, 5, 10, 11 and 16 in Zambia and Zimbabwe.











The three Swiss portfolio outcomes are strongly interlinked. On the one hand, improving livelihoods and wellbeing under Swiss portfolio outcomes 1 and 2 indirectly leads to empowerment and more civil society influence in decision-making. On the other hand, focusing on human rights, access to justice, accountable and transparent governance, credible, transparent and inclusive elections and the rule of law are critical levers for efficient and accountable public institutions and engaged citizens, which are key ingredients for job creation, food security and effective basic service delivery.

#### Transversal themes

Governance, gender and climate change are systematically incorporated and emphasized in all Swiss programming as transversal themes. In addition to being a Swiss portfolio outcome with targeted interventions, governance continues to be used as an entry point to ensure that Swiss cooperation with governmental and non-governmental actors brings about systemic change at the respective portfolio level.

Gender equality is a central component of all Swiss cooperation programmes, and an aspect that Switzerland continuously strives to strengthen in its policy advocacy and programming and capacity building for implementing partners. Gender-transformative approaches in Zambia and Zimbabwe aim to reduce unequal power relations and promote inclusive civic participation. Interventions are tailored to the

particular needs of women and men and results reported in a gender-disaggregated manner.

The Climate, Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction Integration Guidance (CEDRIG) tool of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) will be utilized as the guiding instrument for integrating climate change across the portfolio. Switzerland's focus is on addressing underlying causes of vulnerabilities and promoting adaptive capacity. It will thus invest in climate change adaptation and mitigation and ensure that service delivery and social protection systems are responsive to climate and other shocks. Through its interventions, Switzerland will stress the importance of emergency preparedness and capacities of the governments of Zimbabwe and Zambia. Improved environmental management will be promoted, as well as agriculture techniques and clean energy technologies that ensure the sustainable utilization of natural resources.

#### **Culture for development**

A new Swiss art and culture programme will be developed with one percent of SDC's budget for Zambia and Zimbabwe. The promotion of arts and culture will open additional opportunities to engage with young people and to create the awareness of communities and decision-makers for important topics.



# Programme Management and Implementation Modalities

Swiss whole-of-government approach: Switzerland's international cooperation actors will explore new opportunities for collaboration and synergies to accelerate the achievement of the Swiss outcomes. In particular, better synergies in line with respective mandates will be sought. Moreover, SDC relevant thematic programmes funded at the global level may add to the implementation of this cooperation programme. SECO does not have plans for interventions in the near future, although Zimbabwe and Zambia will be eligible for some of its regional/global programmes as well.

**Partners:** Switzerland will work with a broad range of partners depending on the contexts and on their presence and competences. The Swiss Cooperation Programme for Zimbabwe and Zambia 2023–2026 will rebalance Switzerland's long-term engagement at the regional level in favour of support for local actors and implementation on the ground.

A key new element of this cooperation programme is anticipated closer collaboration with the central and local governments in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Alignment with national development plans and closer coordination will promote ownership and sustainability of Swiss-supported interventions, but also emphasize the role of governments as duty bearers accountable for their actions.

Three categories of regional engagement for achieving Swiss outcomes:

- → Support for SADC mechanisms and SADC-led initiatives implemented by third parties without a specific country attribution
- → Support for institutions with a regional scope on topics related to Swiss priorities where earmarking is not possible or does not make sense
- → Support for multi-country projects with earmarked funding for activities in Zimbabwe and Zambia where Switzerland is part of a regional steering committee and focuses on domestication at national level

Switzerland will continue working with United Nations agencies, specifically in the areas of humanitarian aid, strengthening democracy and sensitive health issues (such as SRHR) as well as with large NGOs and academia, where feasible. Switzerland also recognizes the comparative strengths of contextually embedded local civil society organizations (CSOs) and civil society movements for effective advocacy work and for countering shrinking political and civic space, especially in Zimbabwe.

Collaboration with the private sector as dialogue partners, as stakeholders in market systems development and as project implementers and co-financiers is key for bringing development results to scale and for innovation, and Switzerland will further reflect on potential private sector partners, on the modalities of private sector partnerships and their compatibility/complementarity with interventions aimed at the public sector. Given close connections between parts of the local private sector and the political elite in Zambia and Zimbabwe, partnerships will be carefully assessed through a PEP (politically exposed persons) lens.

**Regionality:** Zimbabwe and Zambia are highly connected with other countries in the Southern Africa region. They face similar opportunities and challenges. Therefore, Swiss cooperation will continue to pursue projects and programmes with a regional scope in exceptional cases, when there is potential to influence regional policies at SADC level and the projects are complementary to national-level activities within the Swiss portfolio. Regional engagements must be coherent and synergetic with the Swiss portfolio outcomes and the added value of a regional approach must be based on clear arguments and evidence.

Development partners' coordination: To implement the present cooperation programme, and for increased development effectiveness, Switzerland will give more attention to donor working groups and active engagement in selected project steering and advisory committees. Well-functioning project steering and advisory committees are cost-effective platforms for Switzerland to guide project implementation, to build direct relations with senior government representatives and other development partners, and to promote the representation of project beneficiaries.

Direct Commitments in Zambia and Zimbabwe by Swiss Federal Offices						
Financial Year	2023	2024	2025	2026	Total	
					2023–2026	
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs – SDC – South Cooperation	29,500,000	32,000,000	34,000,000	34,500,000	130,000,000	
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs – AAF – Peace + Human Rights	600,000	tbd <sup>8</sup>	tbd	tbd	600,000	
Total funds	30,100,000	32,000,000	34,000,000	34,500,000	130,600,000	

Table 1: Indicative financial planning 2023–2026 (in CHF)

**Digitalization:** Improved access to digital technologies and effective use of data and digital systems can be powerful tools in the quest to enhance public sector efficiency, effectiveness transparency and accountability; to increase social benefits – e.g., improved health and increased resilience; and to create jobs and raise private sector productivity. Across all portfolio outcomes, Switzerland will build on the digital transformation accelerated by the pandemic and seek to harness the full potential of digitalization.

Financial flows and resources: In terms of financial flows, Switzerland will continue to consider contributions to multilateral organizations, international and national NGOs and CSOs for programmes that are in line with the objectives of this cooperation programme and explore options for contributing to pooled and trust funds, including those co-chaired by government, and impact-focused blended finance facilities. Switzerland will also keep the option to award mandates, in particular in conjunction with interventions where other development partners are not active.

SDC and the Peace and Human Rights Division (PHRD) of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) have committed funds for implementing the Swiss Cooperation Programme for Zimbabwe and Zambia 2023-2026, amounting to an estimated total budget of roughly CHF 130 million (see Table 1 and Annex 3). SDC's annual resources are expected to increase from CHF 29.5 million to CHF 34.5 million during the four-year programme cycle. While PHRD will phase out its peace policy priority program in Zimbabwe until the end of 2023, it can - based on demand and available resources – selectively support activities in Zimbabwe beyond 2023. The budget beyond 2023 will be determined annually. The allocation of funds for Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively as well as for implementing the different outcomes and complementary interventions<sup>7</sup> is considered an estimate and meant to allow for the needed flexibility, also with regard to humanitarian aid interventions according to the contexts. In addition, Zimbabwe and Zambia will benefit from SDC theHuman resources: Currently, the SDC team at the Swiss embassy in Harare consists of three expatriates and five thematic programme officers, complemented by a shared communication officer and administrative-accounting staff. A further expatriate and local officer are in charge of the peace and human rights endeavours in Zimbabwe<sup>9</sup>. Switzerland has no physical representation in Zambia, frequent visits and virtual means will ensure the necessary level of direct engagement and work at the local level. Swiss and local staff will cultivate a culture of learning, knowledge sharing, skills' development and innovation management and actively participate in SDC global thematic knowledge networks.

**Communication:** Communication will be used to actively shape the way Switzerland is perceived in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Targeted communication activities in both traditional and social media platforms will be used to showcase Switzerland's strengths, values and positions and to explain its international engagement, especially in development cooperation.

matic programmes funded at the global level, for example through core contributions to international and multilateral organizations and initiatives active in the two countries.

<sup>7</sup> Such as in support of transversal themes, small-scale projects and culture.

<sup>8</sup> PHRD's contribution beyond 2023 is only indicative, it will be determined annually.

<sup>9</sup> PHRD's human resources are determined yearly.

### Strategic Steering

The Swiss Cooperation Programme for Zimbabwe and Zambia 2023–2026 will be subject to regular monitoring in order to keep track of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Swiss portfolio and its relevance to intended beneficiaries. Monitoring serves the three-fold objective of (1) evidence-based programme steering; (2) accounting for results; and (3) continuous learning.

Monitoring the cooperation programme is the responsibility of the Swiss embassy. The monitoring system emphasizes national and Swiss portfolio results, whereby achievements of Swiss cooperation are understood as a contribution to achieving national objectives. Monitoring focuses on change at the level of outcomes (institutional and societal change).

The implementation of the cooperation programme is monitored at four different levels (see Table 2):


- Development of the wider country contexts and sector-specific relevant contexts;
- ii) Progress towards selected national development outcomes:
- iii) Achievement of Swiss outcomes (Annex 2), including against Thematic Reference Indicators (TRIs) and Aggregated Reference Indicators (ARIs) that allow Switzerland to communicate on achievements across priority countries in an aggregated manner;
- iv) Embassy performance assessed along selected programme management dimensions.

Among other data gathering instruments, monitoring builds on externally commissioned surveys, annual reports by implementing partners and stakeholder and beneficiary consultations. A mid-term review of the cooperation programme will be conducted after two years.

	Level	Focus area	Instrument	Periodicity
(i)	Country context	Overall country context as relevant to Swiss cooperation programme	Monitoring System for Development-related Changes (MERV) Political report Economic report HR report	At least annually (October)
(ii)	Country results	Progress towards country development and humanitarian outcomes included in the Swiss cooperation programme results framework	Annual report	Annual review (October)
(iii)	Swiss portfolio results	Achievement of Swiss outcomes included in the Swiss cooperation programme results framework against selected indicators and contribution to country outcomes	Annual report Reviews, evaluations and studies	Mid-year review (May/June) Annual review (October)
(iv)	Management results	Achievement of management results included in the Swiss cooperation programme results framework in support of efficient and effective programme implementation	Annual report Office management report Financial reports/audits Internal controls system report	Annual review (October)

Table 2: Overview of monitoring system

# Annex 1: Swiss cooperation programme at a glance



# Annex 2: Cooperation programme results framework

#### Food security and higher income

Swiss portfolio outcome 1: Rural and urban poor, in particular youth and women, develop and access opportunities leading to improved food security, predictable and higher incomes

#### Contributing to sub-objectives of the IC Strategy 2021-2024:

Sub-objective 2: Promoting innovative private sector initiatives to facilitate the creation of decent jobs

Sub-objective 3: Addressing climate change and its effects

Sub-objective 7: Strengthening equitable access to quality basic services

Sub-objective 9: Strengthening and promoting human rights and gender equality

Theory of change: If rural and urban poor, in particular youth and women acquire foundational and enhanced skills, access financial products, adopt drought tolerant crops, agro-ecological farming practices and access clean energy, and if there is increased engagement with the private sector, market linkages are improved and diversified, and nutritious diets promoted (interventions), then agricultural production and value chains of nutritious crops will improve and become more climate resilient (outcome 1.1). And if skills are enhanced, financial products accessed, climate-resilient products and approaches adopted and investment incentivized, then more economic and (self) employment opportunities will be available (outcome 1.2). Because improved agricultural production and value chains, increased economic and (self) employment opportunities contribute to food security and higher income.

#### (1) Swiss outcomes

#### **Outcome 1.1 Agricultural produc**tion and value chains of nutritious crops are strengthened and climate Indicators (disaggregated by gender and age)

Percentage of persons whose diet is healthy (AFS TRI 3)

Source: Project reports: SKI; MASAP; R4; Urban Resilience Programme

#### 7ambia:

Baseline 2022: 70% (F: 55%; Y: 25%) Target 2025: 85% (F: 75%; Y: 40%)

#### 7imbabwe:

Baseline 2022: Rural: 34% (F: 60%: Y: 25%):

Urban: 50%

Target 2025: Rural: 60% (F: 80%; Y: 40%);

Urban: 75%.

#### (2) Contribution of Swiss programme

Swiss support under Outcome 1.1 contributes to food security and predictable and higher incomes. Switzerland supports smallholder agriculture producers and other value chain actors, in particular women and youth, to improve production and value chains. The focus of Switzerland's support is on climate-resilient and nutritious crops that have the potential to benefit women and youth, as well as climate-friendly agricultural techniques. This contributes to strengthening and diversifying the agriculture sector and to improved food security at the national level.

#### (3) Country development or humanitarian outcomes

#### Outcome 1.1 (a): Improving food

**security** (Source: Zimbabwe NDS1 2021-

2025; Zambia 8NDP)

#### **Indicator**

Percent of food insecure people Source: Zimvac & Zamvac

#### Zambia

Baseline 2020: 6% Target 2026: TBA Zimbabwe

Baseline 2021: 27% Target 2025: 5%

#### Outcome 1.1 (b): Increase agriculture production and productivity (Source:

Zambia's 8NDP)

#### Outcome 1.1 (c): Developing and strengthening existing agricultural value chains (Source: Zimbabwe NDS1) **Indicators**

Rural markets access

Source: Yearly Mo Ibrahim report

Baseline 2019: 50/100

Target: N/A Zimbabwe

Baseline 2019: 50/100

Target: N/A

Number of persons (M; F; Y) benefitting from concrete climate change adaptation measures (CCE ARI 1)

Source: Project reports: SKI; OYE; R4; MASAP; FLN, SYP

Baseline 2022: 113,430 (at least F: 58509 and Y: 25935)

Target 2026: TBD

Number of people (M; F; Y) accessing markets (local indicator)

Source: Projects reports: MASAP; OYE; R4; EEP; Urban Resilience Programme; SKI

Baseline 2022: 25,177 Target 2026: 58'250

#### **Assumptions**

- Poor people, in particular youth and women, are willing to build their skills and invest in agricultural production and value chains when they have meaningful opportunities to do so and when they perceive a potential to increase their income;
- Drought-tolerant crops and climate-friendly agriculture techniques, which are less harmful for the environment, become attractive for producers, consumers and investors, with simultaneous support for production, processing, marketing and demand;
- The governments are committed to strengthening and diversifying the agriculture sector, and to engaging smallholders, in particular women and youth, in this endeayour.

#### Risks

- Extreme weather events and other types of shocks affect production and access to food.
- Political and economic elite capture of government investments in agriculture.
- The consequences of the war in Ukraine negatively affect food security and lead to social unrest

Number of small-scale farmers accessing agricultural inputs through the e-voucher and other systems

Zambia

Source: MoA Baseline 2021: 1 mio Target 2026: TBA

Improved traditional grains production Zimbabwe

Source: MoA Baseline 2021: 1 mio Target 2026: TBA

Improved traditional grains production Zimbabwe

Source: MoA

Baseline 2020: 152,515 metric tons Target 2025: 1,000,000 metric tons

Improved groundnuts production

Zimbabwe

Source: MoA

Baseline 2020: 87,480 metric tons Target 2025: 200,000 metric tons

# Outcome 1.2: Economic opportunities and (self) employment are increased, especially in food systems Indicators (disaggregated by gender and age):

Number of persons (M; F; Y) having new or better employment (IED ARI 2, better employment: taking into account people who have a higher income)

Source: OYE; Urban Resilience Programme; EEP, R4, MASAP

Baseline 2022: 11,622 Target 2026: 36,442

Change in yearly income (M; F; Y) (adapted from IED TRI 1)

Source: OYE; MASAP; Urban Resilience; SKI; EEP; R4; RLF; social protection Baseline 2022 (poverty line): Zambia: ZWM 214 (USD 12) / month Zimbabwe: ZWL 23,470 (USD 31) / month<sup>1</sup> Target Zambia/Zimbabwe 2026: 25% above

the poverty line

Number of public and private partners with whom the project partners develop and implement project interventions (IED CSI 2) Source: OYE; MASAP; Urban Resilience; EEP; R4; ARC; Social protection Baseline 2022: 141, including at least 22 private partners

Target Zambia/Zimbabwe 2026: TBD

Swiss support under Outcome 1.2 contributes to predictable and higher incomes. It enables poor people, in particular youth and women, to access and develop economic and (self) employment opportunities. It also incentivizes private sector actors to expand these opportunities, thus contributing to more decent jobs.

#### **Assumptions**

- Poor people, in particular youth and women, are willing to develop their skills, use financial products and link with markets when they perceive a potential to increase their incomes:
- The governments are committed to enhance the business environment, to economic transformation and to enable an increase of (self) employment opportunities, as stated in their plans and strategies;
- There are enterprises with a commercial and/or social motivation to invest in areas that create opportunities for poor people and in particular women and youth. Incentives will trigger investments in this direction.

#### Risks

- Government resources are deviated from development objectives;
- The economic situation sharply worsens due to national and/or global crisis.

Outcome 1.2 (a): Promote Enterprise development (Source: Zambia 8NDP)
Outcome 1.2 (b): Increased decent jobs (Source: Zimbabwe NDS1)

Indicator

Labour force participation rate

Zambia
Source: Labour Force Survey Report (Zamstats)

Baseline 2020: 35% Target 2025: N/A

Zimbabwe

Source: Yearly Labour Force Survey Report

(Zimstats)

Baseline 2021: 43% Target 2025: N/A

Equal socio-economic opportunities<sup>2</sup> Source: Yearly Mo Ibrahim report

Zambia

Baseline 2019: 38/100

Target: N/A **Zimbabwe** 

Baseline 2019: 47.6/100

Target: N/A

Percentage of people below poverty line **Zambia** 

Source: Zamstats

Baseline 2015: 54% below USD 1.90 poverty

line Target: N/A **Zimbabwe** 

Source: PICES, World Bank

Baseline 2020: 49% in extreme poverty

Target: N/A

<sup>1</sup> Total consumption poverty line, July 2022. Source: Zimstats. Official exchange rate 20.01.2023: 1 USD = 747 ZWL.

<sup>2</sup> This indicator assesses the extent to which state jobs and business opportunities are equally accessible regardless of income level, social group or urban-rural location, as well as the extent to which there are institutions and programmes dedicated to the socioeconomic integration of youth.

#### (4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)

- Enhancing skills (technical, soft, SHRH related, entrepreneurial, financial)
- Facilitating access to financial and insurance services and products
- Supporting adoption of drought-tolerant crops, agro-ecological farming practices and access to clean energy
- Private sector engagement through market systems development, impact enterprise support and leveraging private sector investments
- Improving market linkages (with specific attention to rural urban linkages)
- Promoting eating of diversified and nutritious diets
- Fostering investments in productive activities through regular cash-transfer

**Gender:** Gender is captured prominently in the Swiss portfolio outcome itself which focuses on food security and enhancing incomes, especially for youth and women. Indicators used will be gender disaggregated. Throughout the interventions, there will be an intentional focus on women and their influence in business and economic-related decision-making processes. Gender-transformative outcomes will be pursued across the different sector value chains, with a particular focus on gender and socially inclusive approaches and the Gender Action Learning System approach — a community-led household methodology that aims to give women and men more equal control over their personal, household, community and organizational development. Beyond the household level, efforts shall be made to ensure that gender equality issues are considered at policy level and across community and project structures. The gender equality mainstreaming issues shall also be promoted toward project stakeholders such as government structures and private sector players.

**Governance:** Governance results are captured under Swiss portfolio outcome 3. At the micro level, the assumption is that increased incomes lead to enhanced influence in decision-making processes. Interventions aiming directly at increased income will be supported by interventions seeking increased participation by women (see above under gender equality) and youth in business and economic-related decision-making processes by using the gender equality and social inclusion approach. At the macro level, evidence-based advocacy and incentives, such as matching funds, will aim to enhance the effectiveness of national policies and legal frameworks with regards to employment opportunities for rural and urban poor, in particular youth and women. Lastly, political economy analyses will be systematically conducted in new initiatives and when initiatives are transitioning to a new phase. The integration of such analysis in regular context monitoring by implementing partners will be encouraged.

Climate change: The SDC CEDRIG tool will be utilized as the guiding document for integrating climate change, environment issues and disaster risk considerations across the portfolio. Resilience to climate (and other) shocks, as well as climate change adaptation and mitigation will be proactively targeted throughout the interventions. For instance, adoption of climate-resilient products, services and approaches such as agro-ecological farming practices, climate-responsive technologies and processes, will be promoted. Investments and skills will emphasize sectors that contribute to climate change adaptation and mitigation (agro-ecology, drought-tolerant crops, clean energy and green economy through private sector partnerships).

#### (5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)

Financial resources: CHF 61,300,000 (47% of the overall budget)

Human resources: 2 NPOs and 1 transferable staff

Partnerships and modalities:

In order to achieve scale and sustainability, engagement with the governments/SADC and private sector actors will be of upmost importance. Engagement with governments will take place through regular dialogue with key ministries, both bilaterally and through existing coordination platforms. Engagement with governments and the SADC Secretariat will also take place through projects steering/advisory committees and through implementing partners involved in evidence-based advocacy.

Engagement with the private sector is planned to take place through the implementation of initiatives by partners that have a private sector support component. Engaging with the private sector as the direct implementer and co-funder of interventions will also be sought. A dialogue on the business environment and Swiss-supported initiatives with Swiss companies active in Zambia and Zimbabwe is expected as well. The Market Systems Development (MSD) approach will be one of the modalities used. This approach seeks to create sustainable, systemic change with large-scale impact across the portfolio of interventions. It will include incentivizing and facilitating market actors to address market failures and bottlenecks prevalent across the different values chains to be pursued by the portfolio. Interventions will be developed based on regular market assessments.

Working with civil society will include their capacitation in advocacy work in policy spaces with governments at district and national levels in order to promote farmers' rights and farmer participation in policy development.

Project contribution is the main modality given its potential in terms of sustainability and scale. Mandates will be considered whenever relevant.

#### Improved health and resilience to shocks

Swiss portfolio outcome 2: Quality service delivery and shock-responsive systems contribute to improved health and resilience, especially of women, youth and other marginalized populations<sup>3</sup>

#### Contributing to sub-objectives of the IC Strategy 2021-2024:

Sub-objective 7: Strengthening equitable access to quality basic services

Sub-objective 6: Preventing disasters and ensuring reconstruction and rehabilitation

Sub-objective 5: Providing emergency aid and ensuring the protection of civilians

Theory of change: If health service delivery (including for SRH) is improved through a multi-sectoral approach that strengthens human resources, links services to education and community structures, and capitalizes on private sector solutions for health; and if formal and informal systems (including community volunteer cadres, mobile money transactions, beneficiary registries, targeting and grievance mechanisms) for delivery of social assistance in and out of crisis are strengthened and underpinned by reliable vulnerability data; then Zimbabweans and Zambians - especially women, youth and marginalized populations - will benefit from primary health care that delivers quality integrated services according to their needs, as well as from social protection and DRR systems that are more responsive to external shocks. This contributes to the vision of increased wellbeing and resilience to climate change and other shocks because quality service delivery and shock-responsive systems improve the health and resilience of the population.

#### (1) Swiss outcomes

# Outcome 2.1: Primary health care delivers quality integrated services, in particular for sexual and reproductive health Indicators

Number of women, youth, and marginalized persons receiving (at least one of the) quality integrated health services

Sources: FLN, Zvandiri, SYP, O3+, RLF

Baseline 2022: 905'422 Target 2026: 1.2 million

Number of persons subjected to different forms of sexual and gender-based violence having received required (medical, and/or psychosocial, and/or legal) support (GEN\_ARI\_1) Source: Zvandiri, O3+, RLF Baseline 2022: N/A

Percent of patients/clients satisfied with the provision of services based on their needs (including gender-differentiated needs) provided by health facilities

Source: Annual SDC Perception Survey

Baseline 2023: TBD Target 2026: TBD

Target 2026: 15'000

### (2) Contribution of Swiss programme

Swiss support under Outcome 2.1 promotes the delivery of quality services such as HIV prevention, SRHR, GBV prevention, menstrual hygiene management, and PSS at primary health care-level in an integrated manner. Strong emphasis will be on the ability of the health care system itself to deliver these integrated services, including through collaboration across sectors (e.g., education).

#### **Assumptions**

- Negative gender norms and traditions that disproportionately affect women and girls can be changed;
- Good corporate governance based on fairness, transparency and justice prevails.

#### Risks

- Renewed backlash to SRHR and CSE driven by strongly conservative stakeholders and communities or by policy shifts of and consequent shortage of funds from major donors:
- Unsustainable health financing mechanisms and/or diversion of resources in the health sector away from essential services in favour of other priorities (e.g., COVID-19);
- Prolonged labour strikes in the health and education sectors (especially in Zimbabwe).

### (3) Country development or humanitarian outcomes

Outcome 2.1 (a): Improved access to primary and secondary health care and enabling environment for health services delivery (Source: Zimbabwe NDS1 2021–2025)

Outcome 2.1 (b): Increased access to quality health care (Source: Zambia 8NDP 2022–2026)

#### **Indicators**

Maternal mortality ratio (SDG 3.1.1) (HLT\_TRI\_1)

Source: Ministries of Health Baseline 2022: Zambia 213/100'000; Zimbabwe 363/100'000

Target 2030: Zambia 70/100'000; Zimbabwe 70/100'000

Proportion of women of reproductive age who have their need for family planning satisfied with modern methods (SDG indicator 3.7.1) (HLT TRI 4)

Source: National Family Planning Councils Baseline 2022: Zambia 68%; Zimbabwe 86% Target 2026: Zambia N/A Zimbabwe 93%

<sup>3</sup> Vulnerable and marginalised populations currently, or at risk of being, left behind include people living with disability, orphans and vulnerable children, people living with HIV, migrants, prison populations, sex workers, and LGBTQI populations.

# Outcome 2.2: Shock-responsive social protection and disaster risk reduction systems are in place and strengthened Indicators:

Proportion of population protected in at least one social protection area (POV\_TRI\_2) Source<sup>4</sup>: SSPZ

Baseline 2022: Zambia 26.4% Target 2026: Zambia 37%

Extent to which complaints and appeals are registered and/or addressed in a Management Information System

Source: SSPZ

Baseline 2022: Zambia 36% Target 2026: Zambia 60%

Number of persons benefiting from nationally or locally implemented DRR measures (DRR\_ARI\_1)

Source: ARC, R4, URP

Baseline 2022: Zambia 220'662; Zimbabwe

/ 3 2 3 1

Target 2026: Zambia 440'000; Zimbabwe 150'000

Swiss support under Outcome 2.2 seeks to build and strengthen social protection and DRR systems at a macro level to build the resilience of Zimbabwe and Zambia to natural, climate-induced and man-made disasters, as well as to economic, health-related and other external shocks. These systems include community-level structures (e.g., volunteer cadres), robust delivery modalities for social assistance (e.g., mobile money) and national-level beneficiary registries, targeting schemes, grievance mechanisms. Emphasis will be placed on incentivizing the governments to invest in social protection and disaster risk preparedness with their own resources.

#### **Assumptions**

- Preconceptions that social assistance creates dependency on benefits and that cash transfers are not affordable can be dispelled;
- Systems with capability for horizontal (new beneficiaries) and vertical (existing beneficiaries) expansion can be developed and functional:
- Governments and stakeholders take the threat of climate change seriously.

#### Risks

- Duplication of efforts and inefficient delivery due to fragmentation of social protection programmes;
- Insufficient investment in management information systems by governments and partners;
- Macroeconomic environment deteriorates or does not perform/improve.

Outcome 2.2 (a): Quality and affordable social protection (Source: Zimbabwe NDS1 2021-2025)

Outcome 2.2 (b): Improved coordination of social protection programmes (Source: Zambia 8NDP 2022-2026) Indicators

Percentage of households receiving any form of social assistance Source: National VAC reports Baseline 2022: Zimbabwe 74% Target 2026: 85%

Extent to which coordination mechanisms on social protection programming and delivery between the government and donor community exist and are functioning Source: Government Progress and Annual Reports.

Baseline 2022: Social protection coordination in Zambia primarily focused on managing relationships between donors and UN agencies Target 2026: Social protection coordination more government driven with less focus on relationship management

Share of cash transfer beneficiaries receiving payments on time (%)
Source: World Bank (Zambia)
Baseline 2022: Zambia 98.1%
Target 2026: Zambia 100%

#### (4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)

Promoting private sector involvement in the health and social protection sectors, for example through social enterprise development and public-private partnership with national telecom companies

Facilitating better integration of primary health service delivery, for example through "one-stop-shop" approach Leveraging the education sector for better health outcomes (linking educational institutions to health service delivery) Capacity building of human resources in the health sector, for example in providing PSS or youth friendly services Strengthening collection, analysis and dissemination of vulnerability data

Strengthening systems for disaster risk preparedness and management, for example through farmer insurance schemes
Strengthening formal and informal systems for delivery of social assistance in and out of crisis, including community volunteer cadres, mobile money transactions, beneficiary registries, targeting and grievance mechanisms

**Gender:** Interventions are tailored to the different needs of women and men, given their different health-seeking behaviours, their different types and levels of vulnerability vis-à-vis climate and economic shocks, as well as the disproportionate concentration of women in community-level health services, unpaid home care and resulting time poverty. Interventions will support the development of country-specific systems and capacities to respond to GBV and use data to better understand how use of health services and targeting of social assistance programmes cuts across gender lines.

**Governance:** As more and more resources in the health and other social sectors are diverted, Switzerland's efforts will endeavour to ensure essential services are delivered (even through alternative methods) through robust systems for health and social protection and that government budget allocations prioritize health and other social sectors with a focus on the needs of the most vulnerable. Citizen engagement and empowerment in the social sectors will be key for Switzerland, as will be promoting basic service delivery and quality integrated services with parliamentarians and other decision makers.

Climate change: Switzerland's focus is on the importance of service delivery and social protection systems being responsive to the environmental crisis and climate shocks. This includes government support for climate insurance schemes; targeting and supporting those most vulnerable to climate change with social assistance; climate-smart energy solutions, including for health facilities; overcoming disruptions in health service delivery due to climate shocks; and integrating PSS to deal with climate-related disasters (including the rise in sexual and gender-based violence that accompanies them). Switzerland also stresses the importance of the preparedness of the governments of Zimbabwe and Zambia to address climate shocks and to invest in climate change mitigation.

<sup>4</sup> Zimbabwe Social Protection programme in the pipeline.

#### (5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)

Financial resources: CHF 50,300,000 (39% of the overall budget)

Human resources: 2.5 NPOs and 1 transferable staff

Partnerships:

- Governments of Zambia and Zimbabwe at national and sub-national levels (especially through pooled funding mechanisms) as well as like-minded development partners.
- Support will be given to United Nations agencies, CSOs, NGOs, INGOs, think tanks and academia at the national and regional levels.
- Close collaboration with the FDFA Peace and Human Rights Division as part of Swiss portfolio outcome 3 (e.g., access to parliamentarians and decision makers in Zimbabwe).

#### Modalities:

- Both institutional contributions and mandates.
- Expanded private sector engagement to achieve this Swiss portfolio outcome wherever enhancing impact, sustainability and/or scaling effects are possible, as well as to harness the full potential of digitalization e.g., eHealth solutions.
- Use the nexus approach to optimize coherence and cooperation between international cooperation, humanitarian aid and political division.

#### **Democratic governance**

Swiss portfolio outcome 3: Civil society and state institutions engage in more accountable, participatory and inclusive governance.

#### Contributing to sub-objectives of the IC Strategy 2021–2024:

Sub-objective 10: Promoting good governance and the rule of law and strengthening civil society

Sub-objective 9: Strengthening and promoting human rights and gender equality

Sub-objective 8: Preventing conflicts, promoting peace and respect for international law

**Theory of change:** If the capacities and processes of government entities as well as independent oversight institutions are built in a dynamic, innovative context-adjusted manner while dialogue is strengthened, then trust in governance is re-established and public institutions effectively deliver services in an accountable way and in respect of human rights (outcome 3.1). And if citizens have increased agency, voice and capacity to participate in public life, then citizens, specifically women and youth, increasingly participate and influence decision-making (outcome 3.2). Both can contribute to good governance and democratization. Because strengthened capacities and increased trust between civil society and state institutions are key for them to engage in a more accountable, participatory and inclusive governance and reach a strong social contract.

#### (1) Swiss outcomes

# Outcome 3.1: Public institutions effectively deliver services in an accountable way and in respect of human rights.<sup>5</sup> Indicators

Proportion of the population satisfied with the compliance to rules and transparency of procedures of supported institutions in service delivery (Local indicator) (disaggregated by gender and age)

Source: Annual SDC Perception Survey across portfolio

Baseline 2023: TBD

Target 2026: At least 50% of population in supported areas are satisfied with compliance to rules and transparency of procedures (both countries) — to be confirmed after baseline.

### (2) Contribution of Swiss programme

Switzerland's support under Outcome 3.1 strengthens government institutions at various levels and hence contributes to the supply side of governance. Concretely, by building the capacity of different government stakeholder groups and other public authorities, Switzerland will contribute to increased accountability, inclusiveness and strong government institutions able to deliver on their mandates and perform their respective roles.

### (3) Country development or humanitarian outcomes

# Outcome 3.1 (a): Devolution and decentralisation; combatting corruption; transparency and accountability

(Source: Zimbabwe NDS1 2021–2025) Creating a conducive governance environment Indicators

Zimbabwe and Zambia's score in transparency in budget process

Source: Open Budget Survey Baseline 2022: Zambia 30/100; Zimbabwe

49/100

Target 2026: TBD

Zambia and Zimbabwe's score on the corruption perception index

Source: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index

Baseline 2022: Zambia 33/100; Zimbabwe 23/100

Target 2026: TBD

Government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (health, education, agriculture, social protection) (amended SDG indicator 16.6.1)
Source: Social protection — UNICEF Budget Analysis Report/Zambia Institute of Policy Analysis and Research/Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit Reports/ Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Budget Statements and outturns

<sup>5</sup> Not 3.1 is the demand side while 3.2 is the supply side. Its critical to keep the 2.

Proportion of supported or capacitated state and government institutions that have adapted their procedures and service delivery in a participatory way respecting rule of law and human rights to match citizens' demands (local indicator)

(disaggregated by central; decentralized – rural; urban – agriculture; health) Transversal Indicator

Source: Midterm Review of Cooperation Programme

Baseline 2022: N/A

Target 2026: 50% of government institutions and NGOs capacitated have service delivery and procedures that are client responsive and sensitive to rule of law and human rights (both countries) (to be confirmed after baseline)

#### **Assumptions**

- Governments are committed to effectively implementing the constitution and the legal and policy framework;
- Government willingness to address capacity deficits.

#### Risks

- Increasingly unstable and fragile governance environments:
- Possibility of electoral violence.

Baseline Zambia 2022: K 6,3 billion (4% total national budget & 1.3% of GDP) Baseline Zimbabwe 2021: US\$115,1 million (2% total national budget & 3,5% of GDP)

Target Zambia 2026: K 14 billion Target Zimbabwe 2026: USD\$125 million

Outcome 3.1 (b): promote transparency, accountability, citizen participation as well as strengthen governance institutions (Source: Zambia 7NDP)

#### **Indicators**

Percentage of citizens who believe it's important to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly Source: Afro barometer Baseline 2021: Zambia 74.4%; Zimbabwe 61.9% Target 2026 tbc

Percentage of the population that is satisfied with the way democracy works in Zimbabwe Source: Afro barometer Baseline 2021: Zimbabwe 40.5%; Zambia 37.3%

Target 2026 tbc

#### Outcome 3.2: Citizens, specifically women and youth, increasingly participate and influence decision-making. Indicators:

Number of people participating in and influencing public service provision, decision-making and budgets in their localities (disaggregate by age& gender) (GOV ARI 1) Transversal Indicator Source: PSA, FLN, O3+, Zvandiri, SYP, SKI

Baseline 2022: 454 Target 2026: TBD

Number of citizens capacitated to demand better service delivery and take initiatives enhancing state and civil society relations and social cohesion (disaggregated by age and gender (local indicator) Source: PHRD support for elections, Healing and Reconciliation, PSA, ZSP, Annual Perception Survey

Baseline 2022: 132'369 (at least 131'225 youth and 608 female) Target 2026: TBD

Swiss support under Outcome 3.2 seeks to ensure that citizens and specifically women and youth participate and influence decision-making across all levels (from household, to community and national structures). Switzerland's support will include capacity building of civil society, promotion of gender equality and inclusion of marginalized groups, generation of evidence to assist in advocacy and influencing. Support under Outcome 3.2 will strengthen the demand side for good governance which, together with interventions under Outcome 3.1 which focus on the supply side, will ultimately lead to strengthened social contracts in both countries.

#### Assumptions

- That PVO Bill does not close the operating environment for NGOs, CSOs to carry out their work:
- SDC will be able to identify allies within the government, private sector and broader civil society, in addition to like-minded donor organizations;
- Governance interventions from Swiss portfolio outcomes 1 and 2 feed into and are fully aligned with portfolio outcome 3.

#### Risks

- Donors develop a wait and watch approach that could stifle NGO funding;
- Rising levels of violence and oppression (incl. due to political factors; economic factors such as inflation and restructuring).

Outcome 3.2 (a): Improving youth participation; mainstreaming gender in the development process; care and protection of vulnerable groups; human rights and freedoms (Source: Zimbabwe NDS1 2021-2025)

**Indicators** 

Mo Ibrahim & Gender Index Sources: Annual Freedom in the World Index Baseline 2022: Zambia 51/100 partly free; Zimbabwe 28/100 not free Target 2026: TBD

Outcome 3.2 (b) promote transparency, accountability, citizen participation as well as strengthen governance institutions (Source: Zambia 7NDP)

#### **Indicators**

Proportion of seats held by women in (a) national parliaments and (b) local governments Source: Government/parliaments reports tbc Baseline 2022: Zambia: TBD; Zimbabwe: TBD Target 2026: Zambia: TBD; Zimbabwe: TBD

Zimbabwe and Zambia's score in public participation in budget process Source: Open Budget Survey Baseline 2022 (2019): 33/100 (Zimbabwe); 20/100 (Zambia). Target 2026: TBD

#### (4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)

- Capacity building of government entities and independent oversight bodies in their respective roles
- Empowering and strengthening public government actors at different levels
- Creating incentives for power holders to act in the public interest
- Promoting inclusive political dialogue (Zimbabwe)
- Strengthening mechanisms for free, fair and inclusive elections (Zimbabwe)
- Support for healing and reconciliation processes (Zimbabwe)
- Investing in better analysis and understanding of the structures and factors driving corruption (incl. through regular PEA and strengthened MERV approach)
- Effective citizen and civil society (private sector, social movements, and youth) participation is fostered on evidence-based advocacy
- Promotion of women and youth participation at all levels and inclusion of other marginalized groups (HH, community, civil society, government, etc.)
- Promoting Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI)

**Gender:** Gender is captured prominently in the Swiss portfolio outcome 3 itself which focuses on inclusion and human rights. Indicators used will be gender and age disaggregated with a focus on left behind groups when relevant. Additionally, a key focus will be on women's participation beyond quotas. Activities focused on increasing young women's and girls' voices and agency with men and boys' involvement will transform gender norms and relations, while at the same time catalysing broader systemic change in institutions and governance processes.

**Governance:** Governance in addition to being a stand-alone portfolio outcome, continues to be treated as a transversal theme to ensure that work in food security and health programming uses governance as an entry point to bring about systematic change at the respective portfolio level. However, in contrast to the current approach, alignment will be anchored within portfolio outcome 3, with interventions and indicators contributing to the achievement of portfolio outcome 3.

Climate change: The CEDRIG tool will assist in identifying the climate change, disaster risk and environment dimension and possible interventions that can be integrated in the various projects. Adaptive and resilient social protection systems that address the intersectionality among climate change, DRR and social protection will be the entry point for Swiss-supported interventions. This stems from the recognition that climate change adaptation and DRR does not usually focus on the root or social causes of vulnerability that social protection brings to the portfolio to address the root causes of vulnerability. The interventions that will be supported will strive to combine the three thematic areas to shift from addressing shocks to increase positive impacts and address the underlying causes of vulnerability and promote adaptive capacity. Working with government institutions that are decentralized and more inclusive will increasingly enhance the consideration of the lived experiences of communities affected by the environmental crisis and climate change and ensure that responses address the needs of the communities. Additionally, interventions will focus on working with the private sector, including strengthening private sector engagement in governance, by ensuring ethical and inclusive business practices in line with the decent work agenda.

#### (5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)

Financial resources: SDC: CHF 14,400,000 (11% of the overall budget). PHRD's contribution for 2023 amounts to CHF 600'000. The budget beyond 2023 will be determined annually.

Human resources: 1.5 NPOs and 1 transferable staff (from SDC: 0.5 NPO; from PHRD: 1 NPO and 1 transferable staff). Linked to the phasing out of PHRD's peace policy programme in Zimbabwe, there will be no more HSA (transferable staff) from 2024 onwards. Local human resources (NPO) beyond 2023 will be determined annually.

#### Partnerships:

- Governments of Zambia and Zimbabwe at national and subnational levels as well as like-minded development partners.
- Support will be given to United Nations agencies, CSOs, NGOs, INGOs at the national and local levels.
- Collaboration with the Peace and Human Rights Division on the governance component of the Swiss portfolio outcome (e.g., access to parliamentarians and decision makers in Zimbabwe).

#### Modalities:

Both institutional contributions and mandates.

#### (6) Management/performance results, including indicators (Swiss Programme)

- 1. Swiss interventions will apply contribution and mandate modalities. Contributions will allow enhanced coordination and partnering with multilateral and bilateral organizations, international and national CSOs or consortia, while absorbing additional available resources through increased programme budgets and achieving scaling effects. Pooled and trust fund mechanisms and impact-focused blended finance facilities will be further explored. Mandates are considered in conjunction with interventions where other development partners are not active or financially invested.
- Percentage of contributions and percentage of mandates to total financial volume for both modalities
- Recipients of contributions (multilateral organizations, international and national CSOs, pooled and trust funds which include state institutions in their steering mechanisms)
- 2. Project Cycle Management (PCM) and Internal Control System (ICS) are effectively implemented
- Extent to which targets/benchmarks are achieved
- Yearly risk management action plans are elaborated, monitored and reported on
- 3. The internal organization and capacities of embassy staff are conducive to implementing the cooperation programme
- Work in inter-sectoral teams based on the cooperation programme portfolio outcomes
- Changes in responsibilities according to competences and staff renewal as well as evolution of Zimbabwe/Zambia portfolio and presence
- Continued efforts to strengthen operational colleagues in gender-sensitive PCM management
- 4. Transversal themes are systematically addressed in all Swiss programmes/projects
- Training opportunities for transversal themes (gender, governance, climate change) are available and extended to all staff and implementing partners
- Swiss projects have dedicated activities, competencies and budgets for transversal outcomes
- 5. Access to innovations, capitalization and internal learning is emphasized
- Number of new partnerships (including private sector) that trigger innovative solutions or programme implementation mechanisms
- Digitalization is mainstreamed (where indicated) and targeted activities implemented
- Extent to which new knowledge is capitalized, documented and exchanged
- Number and type of events/trainings organized (incl. with other Swiss embassies in the region and SDC/HQ)
- 6. Policy dialogue and impact are optimized in the context of the bilateral programme approach
- Staff competencies and number of opportunities to address sensitive issues with government (such as CSE, accountability/corruption, civic space, human rights, peace and election support, budget allocation to social sectors) are increased
- Number of high-level policy meetings attended
- Number and types of (policy) initiatives implemented/co-financed with other bilateral and multilateral development partners
- Number of (policy) interventions that are fostered and contribute to planned outcomes in collaboration with the Peace and Human Rights
  Division
- Types of synergies and/or collaborations enhanced together with the SDC Division of Thematic or Multilateral Cooperation
- 7. Communication on and visibility of Swiss cooperation, values and interests are actively enhanced
- Number of communications in local media
- Number of visitors to the website of the Swiss embassy
- Number of followers on social media
- 8. Switzerland's promotion of arts and culture opens opportunities to engage with young people and supports awareness creation on important topics to communities and decision-makers
- Types of actions supported and topics addressed under a new culture programme
- 1% of the SDC budget is devoted to art and culture

# Annex 3: Indicative financial planning 2023–2026 (in CHF)

Overview of projected funds by SDC						Approx. Allo	cation <sup>1) 2)</sup>	
Domain/Financial Year	2023	2024	2025	2026	Total 2023–2026	%	Zimbabwe	Zambia
Swiss Portfolio Outcome 1: The rural and urban poor, in particular youth and women, develop and access opportunities that lead to improved food security and predictable and higher incomes	16′000′000	15'600'000	15′200′000	14'500'000	61′300′000	47%	35′500′000	25′800′000
Surian Doutfalia Outnama 2								
Swiss Portfolio Outcome 2: Quality service delivery and shock-responsive systems con- tribute to improved health and resilience, especially of women, youth and other marginalized populations	10'000'000	12'000'000	13′800′000	14'500'000	50′300′000	39%	29'000'000	21′300′000
Surian Dantfalia Outnama 2								
Swiss Portfolio Outcome 3: Civil society and state institu- tions engage in more accounta- ble, participatory and inclusive governance	2′500′000	3'400'000	4'000'000	4′500′000	14'400'000	11%	7′500′000	6′900′000
							72'000'000	54'000'000
Other Interventions Transversal themes; Small-scale projects; Culture	1′000′000	1′000′000	1′000′000	1′000′000	4′000′000	3%		
Title is spe	20/500/000	22/000/000	24/000/000	24/500/000	420/000/000	4000/		
Total indicative SDC budget allocation (to Cooperation Office)	29'500'000	32'000'000	34'000'000	34′500′000	130′000′000	100%		
General overview of project	-4 - al <b>6</b> al a	hu Cudaa Fa	ماء سما ١٩٤٥					
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs – SDC – South Cooperation	29'500'000	32'000'000	34'000'000		130′000′000			
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs – AAF – Peace + Human Rights (the annual budget be- yond 2023 will be defined once the next strategic framework is approved)	600'000	tbd	tbd	tbd	tbd			
Total funds by Swiss Federal Offices	30′100′000	tbd	tbd	tbd	tbd			


Further remarks:

<sup>1)</sup> The allocation of funds amongst Zimbabwe and Zambia will gradually shift from a 60-40 percent split in 2023 to a 55-45 percent distribution in

<sup>2)</sup> SDC will have the operational and financial flexibility (up to 15 percent of the annual budget) to adapt its portfolio and disbursements to pursue projects and programmes with a regional scope in exceptional cases or to react to sudden context changes (e.g., humanitarian needs).


<sup>3)</sup> The progression of funds is not guaranteed. All amounts are tentative and subject to modifications.

## Annex 4: Map of Zambia



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## Annex 5: Map of Zimbabwe



Department of Field Suppor Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section

# Annex 6: Acronyms and abbreviations

CEDRIG	Climate, Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction Integration Guidance
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease
CSE	Comprehensive sexuality education
CSO	Civil society organization
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
FDFA	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
GBV	Gender-based violence
LGBTQI	Lesbian, gay, bi, trans, queer and intersex
MSD	Market systems development
NCDs	Non-communicable diseases
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODA	Official development assistance
PSS	Psychosocial support
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SRHR	Sexual and reproductive health and rights

# Annex 7: Context scenarios 2022–2026 (internal version only)

#### Zimbabwe/Zambia (Commonalities)

#### Economy

#### **Best-case Scenario:**

Economic growth recovers swiftly after the end of the pandemic in 2022 and recaptures the level of pre-COVID-19 periods of far above 5%. Medium-term negative poverty impacts are minimal as a result of a dynamic economy boosted by high commodity prices of extractive industries and positive reforms towards an enabling business environment. Additionally, global supply bottlenecks together with the availability of rich natural resources benefit shorter supply chains with more value addition at the local level in both countries. This increases domestic and foreign investments (first and foremost in Zambia with its private sector-friendly business environment), in sectors that employ large numbers of people, creates jobs and enhances general welfare. The goal of reaching middle-income status by 2030 remains realistic for Zambia and, depending on the management of structural reforms, also in Zimbabwe.

#### **Most-likely Scenario:**

Despite both countries' high economic potential and due to COVID-19 impacts, GDP growth rates stagnate at a low to mid- single-digit level. The COVID-19 crises widened (gender) inequalities but generally the reductions in income, the rise in unemployment and underemployment as well as disruptions in service delivery, labour migration and manufacturing industries caused by the pandemic are only temporary. Net poverty however increases. Post-COVID-19 recovery is slow and hampered by the consequences of the war in Ukraine. Government incentives through supportive economic reform processes and an improved, enabling business environment remain vague and insignificant in the medium term. A growing regional economic integration points to raising incomes for both countries, while energy deficits continue to obstruct the growth of the economies.

Vast natural resources and a comparatively highly skilled population, especially in Zimbabwe, have the potential to trigger additional economic development, prosperity and wealth. Agriculture, mining and tourism (and in Zambia manufacturing) remain the pillars of the economy.

Periods of stable, average to above-average harvests and thriving markets for agricultural and derived value chain products change the economic situation for vast parts of smallholder farmers. Paired with beneficial policy reforms in agriculture and access to private and public investment, credit and insurance schemes this paves the way for sustainable and predictable household incomes allowing for an increasing number of deprived households to escape from and remain out of the poverty trap. For cases of natural disasters national response plans allow relief.

Crop harvests, especially maize, oscillate between above-average seasonal outcomes and dire results due to unsteady rain patterns and negative climate change impacts including occasional droughts and floods as well as global factors and challenges. This instability causes growing proportions of unpredictable levels of household incomes for a majority of families that rely on rain-fed agriculture, aggravates malnutrition of poor, rural and urban population segments and cements continuous high rates of stunting among young children. Frequent humanitarian interventions are only able to alleviate deficits temporarily but miss to address the root causes. Strengthened social protection systems are however capable to guarantee basic, vital livelihood provisions.

#### Worst-case Scenario:

Economic growth only recovers towards the end of the observation period due to the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and other conflict-related shocks at the global level, thus reversing the progress made in poverty reduction since 2000. Vital remittances, especially from Zimbabwean migrants, decline due to political and economic challenges in South Africa and correlated changes in its migration policy as well as global challenges. Rural and urban poor with less education, women, youth and those informally employed will suffer additional disproportionate livelihoods and income losses. Income inequality rises further and extreme poverty indices achieve levels far above the 50% figure, increasingly affecting urban population segments too.

Both countries face further periods of pronounced and lengthy droughts interrupted by frequent and disastrous rainfalls that cause intensive soil erosion, landslides, flooding and infrastructure damage. At national and subnational levels no effective preparedness, coping and/or response strategies are in place nor are there corresponding financial means available. Food insecurity, access to basic services, internal displacement tendencies and poverty prevalence worsens further and needs for external humanitarian response increase significantly.

The IMF Special Drawing Rights and support programmes together with multilateral debt relief and the states' own fiscal commitments and discipline paired with solid economic growth allow to control and gradually reduce the debt burden in the medium to long term, favouring steadily increased budgets for health, education and social protection. This also positively affects inflation rates, price stability and purchasing power of all layers of society. In Zimbabwe, dedicated efforts to accelerate political and economic reforms allow for a positive dynamic in relation building between the government and the international community, resulting in tangible steps towards debt restructuring.

The rising debt burden remains a massive impediment to development and ominous constraint on countries' ability to commit financial resources to the social sectors. Debt services continue to consume a considerable percentage of the available national budgets producing severe backlashes on social spending. IMF Special Drawing Rights, Staff Monitored Programmes and multilateral debt relief efforts generate little impact and progress in the daily lives of citizens during the period of observation, while increasing Chinese debt causes a lot of frustration among the people. Inflation rates remain high around 25% in Zambia, though at the upper double-digit end for Zimbabwe. Whereas Zambia counts on a relatively stable currency, fluctuation is high in Zimbabwe. Both figures enormously downgrade the purchasing power of citizens, especially in Zimbabwe, affect the pricing of imports and decline export revenues. While Zambia receives positive signals from the international community for arears clearance assistance, in Zimbabwe debt relief remains hostage to the political impasse on human rights, land reform and other issues.

The global economy enters a major recession with most OECD economies focusing on own COVID-19 debt burden and rebuilding and consequently reducing their engagement in Africa. Cost of borrowing increases, debt levels rise further and the states' stability deteriorates fast. As the states are no longer able to pay their commitments, spending is reduced drastically, especially civil servant salaries and social spending. Effects from global conflict situations create added, severe strain on the availability of basic goods, agricultural inputs, food security and fuel prices. This together with already high inflation rates paired with loss of value of the local currency results in escalating social unrest in both countries.

The governments' steadfast fight against corruption and firm commitment towards improved transparency and accountability in the use of state budgets and revenues from natural resources significantly increases the level of reengagement from the international community and positively impacts on social spending, citizen-state relations and trust in public institutions.

Endemic corruption remains an ongoing concern and roadblock to sustainable development gains. Cartels and monopolies run by or linked to politically connected individuals, continue to drive corruption since they are in charge of key sectors of the economy such as mining, agriculture and fuel. Transparency and accountability efforts remain often rhetoric and short-term progress is hampered due to under-sourced, ineffective and powerless anti-corruption institutions. The international community however increasingly commits resources to assist governments in capacity building and system strengthening thus creating a change of momentum in addressing corrupt practices.

Corruption further increases, frightening foreign investors and deteriorating the business environment drastically. No clear signals and/or results of anti-corruption measures are visible and the responsible independent anti-corruption bodies fail to preserve any legitimacy and reputation. Profitable natural resources are systematically pilfered for illegal private enrichment and public funds embezzled in arbitral ways generating growing public frustration and social unrest.

#### **Politics**

#### **Best-case Scenario:**

Growing tendencies of credible, transparent and peaceful elections fuel societies trust and faith in democracy and legitimacy of leaders and government entities at different state levels. Multi-party parliaments with an advanced female member quota of 35-50% increasingly represent and preserve the interests of a large majority of all layers of society. Independent, efficient state institutions allow for improved checks and balances, transparency and accountability, progressively apply a service delivery attitude and achieve trusted, effective and tangible government outcomes that satisfy the basic needs and expectations of citizens. A trusted citizen-state-private sector relation paired with a favourable investment climate energizes sustainable development outcomes and growth.

#### **Most-likely Scenario:**

Trust in democracy remains fragile although change of ruling, former liberation parties has recently shown possible in the region, incl. peaceful transition of power, as has been the case in Zambia. The countries will continue to go through sporadic windows of hope, optimism and faith in the power of democracy contrasted by lengthy periods of mistrust and scepticism. This is particularly true in the prevailing one-party system with powerful presidents dominating in Zimbabwe. Ingrained political cronyism paves the way to a general mismanagement of public resources and many missed opportunities. Women's share in political participation and representation in democratic institutions remains fragile, oscillating around 25% compared to a target figure of 50%. Most citizens do not identify with and poorly value government outcomes including a prevailing fragile security environment. A general lack of confidence in and satisfaction with state institutions and its results predominates. Electoral reforms are hardly implemented and violence during elections continues to be a threat.

#### **Worst-case Scenario:**

Democracy gains and women's representation retrogress, mainly attributed to imbalanced playing fields during election campaigns, violence - particularly against women in politics - and missing real checks and balances. The ruling parties use their majority to weaken independent but unaligned state institutions further while concentrating executive power, amend the constitutions to their favour and neutralise civil society and NGOs that raise their critical voices. Election processes and results suffer increasing distortion through intimidation, fear, violence, arbitrary restrictions for opposition forces to campaign and mobilize their constituencies, a continuously shrinking democratic and civic space and suppressed independent election observer missions.

International NGOs and local CSOs are perceived as performing stakeholders in support of poor communities aiming at the efficient and cost-effective implementation of initiatives co-financed by state and development partners. They are not only seen as drivers to advance the SDG agenda but as crucial partners in addressing increasingly severe humanitarian situations.

Civil society and private voluntary organizations fall increasingly under state vigilance and control. Arbitrary administrative and regulatory interference and hurdles limit their organizational functioning, fundraising options and provision of services and advocacy support in favor of poor target communities. Under the hypocritical argument of fighting suspicioned terrorist financing local and international NGOs see their playing ground and scope of work progressively reduced.

International NGOs find it impossible to operate in Zimbabwe and the local CSO sector shrinks dramatically due to pervasive state control, correlated lack of funding as well as administrative and legal hurdles, affecting their important assistance outreach to poor communities. In Zambia Similar tendencies manifest sporadically, associated with critical, politically tense time windows but remain less severe and articulated.

Media can report fairly free and independent on issues of public interest, including by piloting technics of investigative journalism. Governments start recognizing and adding value to the importance of independent media that lay the foundation of an informed citizenry, anchor democracy, enhance transparency and support the fight against corruption. Regular press conferences of political leaders and government entities, and other independent media coverage further stimulate the trust base with public audiences and gradually contributes to wider development outcomes.

COVID-19 mitigation measures such as lockdowns, restrictions on movement of citizens and curfews, designed to combat the spread of the virus during the multiple waves of contagion, opened the appetite of the ruling parties to justify alike regulations for political purposes. On the back of such precedents, pretexts are created to deprive citizens of fundamental rights and engage in politically repressive tactics, such as crackdowns on opponents, dissidents, journalists and freedom of speech and assembly. This is particularly the case during election periods and other tense political times. Under the pretext of cyber security and protection, the control of online spaces will become an endemic routine. Media increasingly comes under state pressure.

Due to growing socio-economic hardship and poverty for a majority of the population, governments are increasingly deploying restrictive and repressive measures in order to retain control of multiplying unrests, protests and anti-government manifestations. These include the silencing of critical media voices, intimidation/arrest and abduction of journalists, the over-regulation and shutdown of online and civic spaces, discussion platforms and social networks.

#### Social / Humanitarian / Environment

#### **Best-case Scenario:**

Effective governmental economic recovery programmes together with strong global growth leave felt recessional signs behind and allow states to rebuild an even stronger social service delivery system compared to pre-COVID-19 times. Un- and underemployment decreases sharply and brings relief to many threatened households to escape the poverty trap with a restored optimistic health, education and food security perspective for their families. A vibrant and dynamic economic environment lays the foundation for municipalities' increased prosperity permitting a rapid improvement of municipal infrastructures, assets and services and restore healthy living conditions for all citizens. Parallel to debt relief efforts, the government, particularly in Zambia, succeeds to address pending investments in macro infrastructure, such as energy and transport networks.

#### **Most-likely Scenario:**

Multidimensional poverty remains pervasive in large parts of low-income population segments. Rural and urban poor feel increasingly deprived from health, education and nutrition access. Despite modest reduction of unemployment rates and slowly expanding social protection schemes following the COVID-19 pandemic, above all in Zambia, many poor struggle to safeguarding essential basic provisions for their daily lives, affecting particularly the wellbeing of women and children. Whereas the productivity of agricultural land in rural areas decreases due to environmental degradation, in urban and peri-urban settings hazardous conditions raise as a result of inadequate response of municipal services to pollution, waste disposal and lack of water supply. Especially in Zimbabwe, municipal investment plans are critically underfinanced and basic infrastructure can only be minimally maintained. This is partly because the informal sector dominates the economy, limiting the capacity of local governments to collect taxes.

#### **Worst-case Scenario:**

Poverty becomes chronic to wider segments of the rural and urban poor and lower middle-income class. Adequate access to health and education is a growing concern and the restoration of basic social service delivery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic is slow and delayed. Authorities fail to maintain basic municipal infrastructure and healthy urban and communal environments. Food insecurity and stunting of small children paired with chronic diseases due to exposure to environmental hazards and other shocks and stresses increases dramatically. This all culminates in a disastrous effect on literacy levels, academic abilities and skills development for a whole generation.

The impact of COVID-19 lockdowns on education, schooling and related communal safety nets is only temporary and after a swift normalization of the socio-economic parameters in 2022, the supportive environment that radiates from educational institutions restores quickly. Supplementary budget allocations to the education sector allow for more adequately equipped schools and better remunerated and thus higher motivated teachers who in turn roll out many efforts to recover delayed learning subjects from the last years' curricula and invest extra time in complementary support programmes for fallen behind pupils. Education outcomes bounce back stronger compared to pre-COV-ID-19 periods and the negative impact of the pandemic on education in rural and urban areas shows insignificant after a two-year period.

Due to the pandemic, schools have only been open for an average of around 6-9 months for the last two years. The prolonged school closures instigated by the lengthy lockdown intervals show already now multiple negative impacts that are threatening to last. Pupils in public schools and those residing in rural areas without or insufficient access to online learning alternatives are most affected and have fallen behind. Education outcomes are poor and parents demotivated to continue investing their meagre household incomes in school fees and related costs, especially for girls. Mitigating and reverting the negative social, nutritional and communal safety net effects that derive from closed schools requires a joint and dedicated effort of all stakeholders engaged in the educational domain and concerned support structures. In order to avoid long-term implications, the swift rebuilding of at least a pre-COVID state of school environment will need particular attention during the next two years.

The poor education outcomes under the pandemic's lockdown and school closing scenarios paired with missing online learning options have demotivated poor families in rural and underprivileged urban areas to invest imploded family budgets in education for their children affecting disproportionally young children and girls. Energy poverty has further exacerbated these conditions. Without the social, nutritional and communal safety net that schools provide, millions suffer from heightened food insecurity as well as increased GBV and teenage pregnancy. As no guick economic recovery from the COVID-19- induced recession is at the horizon for this population group, this trend likely has devastating long-term implications for health and education outcomes.

Climate change impacts are successfully managed under a comprehensive, long-term and wide-spread risk management strategy with substantive and efficient mitigation mechanisms that benefit the poor and underprivileged through effective risk derivation, sharing and compensation instruments. On the political agenda, a climate and environment responsive dialogue that stimulates change, youth entrepreneurship and innovation towards a vibrant green energy sector with entry points for governments and development partners opens new perspectives. This encourages strong investments in low- and non-carbon energy solutions including benefits for rural and remote population groups.

The negative effects of climate change grow with a marked increase of flash floods, droughts and storms. Below average to poor rainfall seasons become the norm. Climate change-induced weather events directly lead to damaged physical assets, degraded ecosystems, wiped-out livelihoods and reduced outputs from key economic sectors, threatening to undermine poverty reduction and achievement of development goals.

Political commitments towards greenhouse gas reductions and building back intensive carbon investments, partly forced by China's decision to stop financing coal industries abroad, risk to reduce economic competitiveness in the short-term when not accompanied by required external financing, capacity building and technology transfer.

Extreme weather events claim a disastrous toll on livelihoods and economic foundations of the two countries. Poverty indices rise and recovery capacities of affected communities degenerate quickly. Development goals increasingly become unreachable and desperation of poor people escalates. Greenhouse gas and environmental rhetoric stands in sharp contrast to real, immediate and daily needs of poor population segments and fosters social conflicts between a scientifically, evidence-based mid- to long-term assessment of ecological damages versus real life challenges contested by low and lower-middle-income societies.

#### Security

#### **Best-case Scenario:**

Improved living conditions, service provision and macro-economic stability lead to a long-lasting political de-escalation and general satisfaction and acceptance of government and state institutions' performance. Police and army forces are depoliticized and regain strong reputation among citizens. Rare corruption incidents among security forces are legally settled. This evolution is more likely in Zambia then in Zimbabwe.

#### **Most-likely Scenario:**

Peace and stability are predominant but come at the cost of frequent human rights violations. Law enforcement and security forces use excessive force and partake in abductions, beatings, torture and other forms of cruel and degrading treatment. Political dissidents and protestors are common victims of brutality by police forces that are largely perceived to be arms of the ruling parties. These scenarios repeat regularly in times of elections and widespread economic hardship.

#### **Worst-case Scenario:**

Continued economic downturn tendencies generate an increasingly tense environment with a majority of poor households, particularly in Zimbabwe, incapable to cover basic health and nutrition needs and other social expenditures. While frequent street protests manifest, governments respond with bare force. Intentions to open a most needed dialogue are ignored and daily violence increases.

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